The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: an Australian response by John Lee
In August 2007, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) captured 
world attention through two actions. It sponsored the second exercise 
in two years involving the Chinese and Russian militaries, punctuated 
by the SCO’s call for a multilateral world security order. And at their 
preceding summit, the group’s heads of state agreed to create a unifi ed 
energy market among their countries. As the SCO accounts for some 8% 
of global oil reserves and 30% of natural gas reserves—fi gures that will 
approach a fi fth and a half of the respective totals if Iran’s membership 
request is approved—speculation is rife that the prophesied anti-US 
alliance has arrived.
A clear Australian posture is required towards this group, the only 
international security organisation that excludes the US. Australia’s 
response should however be driven not by alarming gestures and 
statistics, but by recognition of the SCO’s limitations, and of its role as a 
stabilising force in a volatile region. Australia’s policy should be constructive 
engagement, aimed at integrating the SCO into the wider international 
system. The group’s emphasis on functional cooperation, and in particular 




The USSR’s collapse created a power vacuum along its frontier with 
China, a border that was both disputed and highly militarised. The states 
concerned—a weakened Russia, fl edgling Central Asian republics and a 
China focused on economic growth—had a common interest in prioritising 
stability over confrontation. Towards this end they pursued a series of 
border-demarcation and confi dence-building measures that became known 
as the ‘Shanghai Five’ (S5) process, after the fi ve participants: China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
By the late 1990’s, the threat to the S5 states from mutual aggression 
had been superseded by that of radical Islamic movements. There was 
also a perceived need for solidarity against Western interference in other 
states’ domestic affairs under the rubric of democracy and human rights, 
particularly after NATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign. These three objectives 
underpinned the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 
June 2001, with Uzbekistan joining the S5 parties in an institutionalised 
group with a Secretariat and Charter. The SCO’s stated goals are to 
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strengthen mutual trust, to combat ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’ 
and to promote a ‘fair and rational’ international order based on respect for 
state sovereignty.1
Western media commentary has been fi xated on the SCO’s potential as 
a hostile strategic actor. In this regard the group was initially dismissed 
as impotent, a view seemingly confi rmed by the SCO’s silence over the 
establishment of US and NATO bases on its members’ territory in late 2001. 
In mid-2005 however, the SCO issued a declaration calling for closure of 
these bases. This was followed by Uzbekistan’s expulsion of US forces, 
the fi rst Sino–Russian military exercise and the SCO’s granting of observer 
status to Iran, which began lobbying the group to form a ‘gas cartel’.
Combined with its advocacy of a multipolar international system, these 
events have provided the basis for growth of a threat narrative around the 
SCO. The group insists that it is not aligned against third parties, but its 
geographic scope raises the spectre of a return to bloc politics, especially 
given the international context. The last two years have witnessed US–India 
convergence, Japan’s promotion of an ‘arc of democracies’ ringing the Asian 
continent and the initiation of a quadrilateral security dialogue between 
the US, India, Australia and Japan. Tensions have grown between Russia 
and the NATO states on one hand and China and Japan on the other, 
marked by advances in US missile defence and moves by Japan towards a 
normal security posture. The SCO’s ‘Peace Mission 2007’ military exercise 
coincided with a major drill involving the US, Indian, Japanese, Australian and 
Singaporean navies.  
Against this backdrop, the SCO is easily portrayed as the vehicle for a 
Sino–Russian grand design to align continental Eurasia against the US, 
evoking Halford Mackinder’s concept of a unifi ed world heartland challenging 
a maritime hegemon. Less ambitious pundits conceive it as a ‘new Warsaw 
Pact’ that will project military power against South Asia or the Middle East, 
or as an ‘energy club’ locking up a large part of the world’s oil and gas 
reserves. Yet a cursory study reveals that the SCO is unlikely to develop in 
any of these ways.
A limited security actor 
To begin with, the strategic costs to China and Russia would be 
disproportionately high given the constraints that each state operates 
under. China remains dependent on export markets, foreign investment 
and sea lines of communication controlled by potential enemies. Beijing’s 
overarching strategic goal is an external environment that is both stable 
and open. It has thus emphasised its desire for a ‘peaceful rise’, an 
approach that would be undermined by aggressive use of the SCO. Russia’s 
waning infl uence throughout the former Soviet bloc has obliged Moscow 
to adopt the collaborationist approach embodied by the SCO. Any return 
to hierarchical models would drive its former client states further towards 
the US and EU. Most importantly, both China’s and Russia’s interest in 
cooperative relations with the US exceeds anything they could gain from fi xed 
alignment against Washington.
Nor are there good prospects for Sino–Russian relations growing suffi ciently 
close to support a coordinated strategy. Policy elites in both states not only 
nurse a mutual distrust with deep historical roots, but perceive ongoing 
structural differences in their interests. Their ‘strategic partnership’ is 
tempered by strategic competition, evident in manoeuvres for access to 
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Central Asian military bases and energy resources, as described below. The 
fact that both Beijing and Moscow describe third parties as ‘strategic partners’ 
shows that they do not view their mutual relationship as unique, but rather as 
another hedge in their bilateral portfolios.
Most importantly, the SCO states cooperate with external actors at each 
other’s expense.  The bilateral deals struck by Central Asian members to 
allow the US military onto their territory in late 2001, for instance, threatened 
Russia and China with strategic encirclement.  The Central Asian states 
openly pursue ‘multi-vector diplomacy’, receive substantial aid from outside 
the SCO, and in two cases (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) still permit foreign 
bases on their soil despite the 2005 declaration.  Russia has vacillated 
between China and Japan in constructing its new Siberian oil pipeline, 
and continues to foster a closer defence relationship with New Delhi than 
with Beijing.
This lack of cohesion refl ects the SCO’s origins in a mutual security 
dilemma. Neither China nor Russia can dominate Central Asia, yet both 
are concerned to prevent it becoming a hostile bloc—whether independent 
or under direction from an external power, including each other—or a 
source of radical movements that could spill across to their territories. The 
SCO entrenches both states within the region in a manner acceptable to 
all parties, by formalising their engagement within a consensus-based 
multilateral framework.  
 
Thus the SCO promotes confi dence among its members, without constraining 
them from independent pursuit of self-interest. The closest analogy is not 
the Warsaw Pact but the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
a group created to stabilise internal relations. Like ASEAN, the SCO 
accommodates confl icts between external alignments through minimal 
institutionalisation. It lacks a joint military headquarters, collective defence 
article or any other feature of a NATO-style alliance. The SCO’s only security 
institution is the Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS), whose activities are 
apparently confi ned to sharing intelligence on domestic threats.
Fundamentally, the SCO exists to regulate an internal zero-sum game. 
For China, it provides an entry vehicle into a historical Russian sphere of 
infl uence, giving a multilateral cloak to Beijing’s bilateral initiatives. Conversely 
the SCO framework allows Russia to monitor and restrain China’s regional 
inroads, while avoiding open confl ict with its ‘strategic partner’. Relations 
among the Central Asian states remain burdened by border disputes, trade 
wars and alleged aggression through terrorist proxies. Chinese economic and 
demographic penetration is a long-term concern for other SCO members. 
Such contradictions within the SCO do not preclude functional cooperation, 
but the group’s strategic policy cannot exceed the sum of its members’ 
interests. Those interests align only on maintaining their domestic political 
status quo, for instance through solidarity against external pressure for 
reform. Thus the SCO defended Uzbekistan’s suppression of the Andijan 
protests in 2005, helping President Karimov to weather calls for an 
international investigation from the US, EU and the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However the failure of other SCO 
members to follow Uzbekistan’s lead in expelling US forces, and the SCO’s 
non-response to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘tulip revolution’ earlier that year, reveals limits 
to the group’s commitment to regime preservation.  
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The SCO’s other strategic driver is the activity of radical Islamic movements 
on member states’ territory. For the Central Asian regimes these groups 
potentially pose an existential threat, exhibited by the operations of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000. Russia and China 
are burdened with separatist movements in Chechnya and Xinjiang, which 
have ethnic and religious affi nities with Central Asia and in some cases a 
transnational presence in the region. Thus all military exercises among SCO 
members have offi cially been directed at ‘terrorists’ and ‘separatists’, rather 
than third-party states. In February 2008 the SCO’s Secretary-General 
announced that the group will conduct such exercises on a regular basis.
Sceptics point to the scale of these manoeuvres—which have involved 
amphibious assaults and strategic bombers—and note that the group’s 
2001 treaty2 allows members to deploy troops abroad in response to 
loosely-defi ned threats. However the SCO has failed to follow through 
proposals to create a rapid reaction force or integrate with the extant military 
framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), to which 
all members except China belong.3 Russia and the Central Asian states have 
signalled that a Chinese military presence on their territory is unwelcome, 
while the Chinese have made clear their lack of interest in joining a collective 
security system.
In short, the SCO states have not shown suffi cient mutual trust or motivation 
for the group to play a military role beyond its borders. The SCO is unlikely 
for instance to displace the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan, despite an apparent declaration to that effect at the group’s 
2007 summit. The SCO’s external impact is indirect but positive: it stabilises 
relations among its members and facilitates cooperation against transnational 
threats. Regarding the latter, SCO initiatives include a proposed nuclear 
fuel-cycle centre, an ‘anti-narcotics belt’ around Afghanistan and development 
programs targeting Central Asian poverty.
Presently however, these projects are either moribund or being pursued 
outside the SCO framework. For example the ex-Soviet members persist with 
a counternarcotics regime that excludes China, while Chinese loans offi cially 
made under SCO auspices are negotiated on a bilateral basis. Consistent 
with the SCO’s origins, this suggests an exploitative rather than genuinely 
collaborative attitude towards the multilateral framework. This is most evident 
in the fi eld where the SCO might otherwise have real potential to threaten 
foreign interests.
Energy cooperation  
While the SCO is unlikely to become an energy ‘cartel’ given its inclusion of 
one large consumer, an internal market driven by Chinese demand seems 
plausible, particularly after the group’s 2007 summit. Given the proportion 
of world oil and gas reserves controlled by SCO states, such a project 
should concern external consumers. However it requires extensive new 
infrastructure, which implies a commitment to coordinated investment and 
short-term losses among the group’s members.
Instead Russia guards its Soviet-era monopsony over the Central Asian 
states’ energy exports, forcing them to sell below market price and driving 
them to seek alternative options. The putative SCO ‘energy club’ is already 
compromised by several proposed or functioning pipelines linking Central 
Asia with non-SCO states. Extant pipeline projects between SCO members 
have proved hostage to funding disputes and fears of Chinese dominance. 
Even were the requisite political will found on all sides, the SCO states may 
lack suffi cient capital to link the group’s reserves viably to Chinese markets.
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External investment within the SCO has to date, been uncoordinated and 
hampered by the reluctance of these states to allow foreign holdings in their 
energy sectors. An open SCO coordinating process could address these 
problems and deliver substantial international public goods. Diversifying 
supply would erode the ‘Asian premium’ paid on oil imports from the Middle 
East and ease tensions caused by international competition for energy 
security. Even limited outcomes like price stabilisation could benefi t external 
consumers. The SCO’s recent pledge to involve ‘all interested states’ in the 
group’s energy policy offers hope that it is moving towards an open approach.
Declarations, however, should not be confused with action. It is unclear 
whether a substantive energy plan was signed at the August 2007 summit, 
despite at least one such proposal being brought to the table. The Chinese 
Premier’s visit to Moscow in November 2007 indicated not only that basic 
issues like prices and pipeline routes remain unresolved, but that SCO 
members continue to approach these problems bilaterally.
Real progress on energy cooperation is unlikely so long as SCO energy 
sectors remain burdened by ineffi cient state ownership and leaders free 
to make economically irrational decisions. The main obstacle is Russia’s 
insistence on using Central Asian imports to subsidise state control of its 
own energy sector, but other SCO states also politicise energy policy to their 
collective detriment. Unless the SCO can improve governance within its 
members, its contribution to a multilateral energy regime will be peripheral.
Unfortunately the group’s political character militates against such change. 
From inception the SCO has emphasised non-interference in states’ internal 
affairs and national particularism, in place of specifi c commitments and 
supranational governance. This approach cannot address issues grounded 
in domestic political-economy, such as energy policy. The perceived threat of 
Western-sponsored ‘colour revolutions’, particularly since the Andijan events 
and the change of regime in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, has only hardened SCO 
regimes’ resolve against internal reform.
Political symbolism 
Threat assessments of the SCO must account for its members’ tendency 
to use the group for propaganda purposes. Russia in particular exploits the 
SCO’s ‘political deterrent potential’ to compensate for its own relative decline 
in power. For instance, shortly after Moscow’s suspension in July 2007 of a 
key arms-control treaty with the NATO states, the Russian-led CSTO and the 
SCO, eventually signed in October; in between, Putin used the backdrop of 
Peace Mission 2007 to announce Russia’s resumption of strategic bomber 
patrols. More generally Putin’s government likes to describe the group as 
a ‘living bond’ between Europe and Asia, implying that Russia remains a 
signifi cant player in both areas.
For China, the SCO’s political capital lies more in soft power. The 
SCO Charter contains all the principles central to China’s self-declared 
‘peaceful rise’: respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, 
non-alignment, UN primacy, consensus decision-making, functional 
cooperation and ideological neutrality. The SCO offers proof that China can 
relate harmoniously to small countries, even in the presence of historically 
antagonistic great powers. As the only multilateral body created by China, 
it is the one concrete alternative Beijing can offer to prescriptive and 
obligations-based US leadership.
Such posturing may be a useful hook for cultivating states of interest to 
Moscow and Beijing, but it has not translated into meaningful action against 
US interests. For instance the SCO has not accepted Iran’s membership 
requests or intervened in the dispute over its nuclear program. Such actions 
seem mandated by the group’s creed of preserving regional stability and 
noninterference in states’ internal affairs, but they would compromise wider 
Chinese and Russian objectives. The SCO’s subordination to its members’ 
individual goals confi nes it to being ‘more a forum than a force’. This is 
precisely why the group should be viewed as more benign than adversarial.
A place in the architecture
‘Asia’, broadly defi ned, is unlikely to develop a unifi ed security architecture in 
the near future. Regional institutions should thus be encouraged, to the extent 
that they produce a net security gain. The SCO has achieved this among its 
members and currently presents no credible threat to foreign interests, within 
Central Asia or beyond. While the chance of it playing an antagonistic role 
cannot be excluded, this is more likely to result from external pressure than 
from the group’s internal dynamics.
To avoid this outcome, foreign powers should accord the SCO a legitimate 
place in the growing web of international organisations. This is particularly 
important with respect to China, whose growing infl uence and range of 
foreign interests will inevitably give rise to new international structures. The 
SCO is more institutionalised and security-focused than (for example) the 
East Asian Summit, but the appropriate response is similar: engagement, not 
containment, is the lowest-cost strategy.
Furthermore, Central Asia can no longer be conceived as a discrete 
strategic theatre. It is linked with all contiguous regions by networks of 
terrorism, weapons proliferation and narcotics traffi cking, threats not 
amenable to unilateral or even bilateral responses. Developing transport links, 
such as proposed pipelines connecting Turkmenistan and Iran with India 
and the ‘strategic corridor’ linking China with the Pakistani port of Gwadar, 
create further pressure for an integrated approach to the so-called Central 
Eurasian macroregion.
The SCO’s role in shaping this strategic environment is recognised by all 
major players. The US has applied unsuccessfully for observer status at 
SCO summits. Iran and Pakistan are vigorously pursuing membership, while 
Afghanistan, Turkey and India are observers at SCO summits. The SCO 
has already become a platform for regional security dialogue. For instance 
the Indian Air Force Base in Tajikistan was negotiated during the 2006 SCO 
summit, reportedly with Chinese sponsorship.
India’s involvement with the SCO could potentially broaden the group’s role 
still further. The development of an annual trilateral dialogue between India, 
China and Russia has raised the prospect of a security regime spanning 
continental Asia, possibly facilitated by the SCO. One analyst has suggested 
engaging China in a ‘Helsinki process’, in which the SCO might serve as the 
nucleus of an Asian version of the OSCE.
Such initiatives however would polarise regional security, which the relevant 
actors have signalled is not their desired approach. Meetings of the SCO and 
the India-China-Russia dialogue repeatedly stress that they are not directed 
against third parties. The same factors that originally structured the SCO—
confl icting interests and desire for freedom of manoeuvre—will undermine 
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efforts to build a larger security institution upon it. Thus despite the SCO’s 
readiness to admit observer states, there is no sign of the group lifting its 
moratorium on new members.
Foreign policy-makers can have confi dence in the SCO’s ongoing relevance. 
The group has observer status at the UN and has developed contacts with 
all neighbouring states, as well as international organisations such as the 
EU and OSCE. In contrast to previous Central Asian groupings, member 
states continue to invest political capital in the SCO and to expand its agenda 
and institutions, giving it the self-elaborating dynamic typical of successful 
international bodies.
The best index of the SCO’s durability is its entrenchment of two great 
powers in a region where both have vital interests. SCO member states loom 
large in China’s plans for energy security, both as suppliers and as transit 
routes for imports from further west. Central Asia is also economically vital 
to Xinjiang, a province that Beijing has prioritised for development and which 
itself contains signifi cant mineral wealth. Russia’s growing reliance on energy 
as a foreign policy weapon would not be viable without Central Asian imports. 
Even a more benign government in Moscow could not avoid engagement on 
its southern fl ank, given the lack of a defensible frontier and the presence of 
signifi cant Russian minorities in the region.
An Australian policy response
China, the US, the EU, NATO, India, Pakistan and Japan are all engaged 
in Central Asia. The presence of so many major actors in Australian foreign 
policy in itself justifi es close attention to the region and its institution. It also 
means that there is little chance of Central Asia being dominated by one 
or two states. There is thus no cause for supporting efforts to undermine 
or ‘balance’ the SCO, which would create a needless point of international 
tension. Australia has no vital interests in Central Asia, but a strong interest in 
good relations between the region’s involved parties, particularly China and 
the US.
Australia’s policy towards the SCO should be one of dialogue and functional 
engagement, an approach already favoured by other actors. ASEAN has 
signed a cooperation agreement4 with the SCO, the EU is considering an 
‘ad hoc dialogue’, and similar initiatives have been proposed for NATO. Even 
the US, despite rejection for observer status, has signalled that it views its 
relationship with the SCO in positive-sum terms.
An Australian effort to obtain SCO observer status is probably not justifi ed, 
and might attract suspicion of US involvement. However if the SCO adopts 
extant proposals for a functional cooperation program similar to NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace, Australia should consider participation. Regarding 
narcotics traffi cking for instance, the Australian Federal Police could 
contribute expertise and build on existing contacts with Chinese authorities. 
This is a particularly signifi cant area given the role of SCO states as transit 
routes for Afghan narcotics exports, and the prospect of a long-term 
Australian commitment to Afghanistan’s security.
Counter-terrorism is another potential fi eld for cooperation. However 
caution is merited here, given the group’s record of uncritically endorsing 
questionable measures under the rubric of fi ghting terrorism. It must also be 
noted that, with the exception of the presently defunct IMU, the links between 
Central Asian radical movements and extraregional terrorist groups are 
tenuous at best.
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Traffi cking and terrorism are linked to governance problems within the 
Central Asian states that are unlikely to be resolved without fundamental 
reform, which the SCO will not facilitate. Even if practical results are poor, 
however, cooperation with the SCO should be pursued for political effect. 
It would add substance to Canberra’s declarations about symmetry in its 
international relations, balancing such actions as Australian participation in 
the quadrilateral dialogue and the 2007 security agreement with Japan.
Australia should similarly support SCO energy cooperation efforts. Such 
involvement might give Australian companies an opening into Central 
Asian markets, especially given regional states’ desire to diversify foreign 
investment and expertise. Central Asian producers are also unlikely to 
compete with Australia for access to China’s energy market. Their reserves 
hold strategic rather than economic advantages for China, and in any case 
that country’s energy demand will far exceed what SCO members can supply.
The ‘Shanghai Spirit’ of mutual trust and advantage that is said to underpin 
the SCO accords with the standard for international behaviour demanded 
by Western countries of China and Russia. Engaging the SCO would thus 
be consistent policy towards these great powers, and unproblematic given 
the group’s emphasis on functional cooperation and transnational threats. 
The SCO should be viewed not in terms of zero-sum geopolitics, but of 
interdependence in a globalised world.
Endnotes
1 Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 7 June 2002 (Article 1).
2 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 15 June 2001.
3 However under a recent (February 2008) agreement between the two bodies, the armed 
forces of CSTO member states will be able to participate in future SCO exercises.
4 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations and the Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 21 April 2005.
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